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Abstract
While the discussion on the foundations of social understanding mainly revolves
around the notions of empathy, affective mentalizing, and cognitive mentalizing, their
degree of overlap versus specificity is still unclear. We took a meta-analytic approach
to unveil the neural bases of cognitive mentalizing, affective mentalizing, and empa-
thy, both in healthy individuals and pathological conditions characterized by social
deficits such as schizophrenia and autism. We observed partially overlapping net-
works for cognitive and affective mentalizing in the medial prefrontal, posterior cin-
gulate, and lateral temporal cortex, while empathy mainly engaged fronto-insular,
somatosensory, and anterior cingulate cortex. Adjacent process-specific regions in
the posterior lateral temporal, ventrolateral, and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex might
underpin a transition from abstract representations of cognitive mental states
detached from sensory facets to emotionally-charged representations of affective
mental states. Altered mentalizing-related activity involved distinct sectors of the
posterior lateral temporal cortex in schizophrenia and autism, while only the latter
group displayed abnormal empathy related activity in the amygdala. These data might
inform the design of rehabilitative treatments for social cognitive deficits.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Interpersonal behaviors are a core component of humans' life (Henry,
von Hippel, Molenberghs, Lee, & Sachdev, 2016), mediated by the
ability to represent others' intentions, thoughts, and emotions (Arioli,
Crespi, & Canessa, 2018). Over the last two decades, the growing evi-
dence on the neuro-cognitive bases of social understanding (Fortier,
Besnard, & Allain, 2018) paralleled an increasing awareness of the
inconsistent theoretical, neurobiological, and semantic definitions and
classifications of the underlying processes (Cerniglia et al., 2019;
Schurz et al., 2020). While this field revolves around the notions of
Empathy and Theory of Mind (ToM, or mentalizing) (Dvash &
Shamay-Tsoory, 2014), different terms are often used to describe sim-
ilar processes and, sometimes, similar terms are used to refer to differ-
ent processes (see Happe, Cook, & Bird, 2017).
The mentalizing system is generally considered to involve two
distinct components, drawing inferences on others' beliefs and inten-
tions (i.e., cognitive mentalizing) and on their emotions and feelings
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(affective mentalizing; Shamay-Tsoory, Harari, Aharon-Peretz, &
Levkovitz, 2010), respectively. It is still debated, however, whether
this distinction reflects in specific versus common neural bases
(Molenberghs, Johnson, Henry, & Mattingley, 2016). Here, we took
advantage of a meta-analytic approach to integrate—within a unitary
discussion—the available fMRI evidence on the neural bases of cogni-
tive mentalizing, affective mentalizing, and empathy, both in healthy
individuals and in distinct pathological conditions, such as schizophre-
nia (SC) and autism, that have been strongly characterized by marked
deficits in social understanding. Despite the central role of these pro-
cesses in social cognition, to the best of our knowledge this is the first
study addressing (a) their common versus specific neural bases in
healthy individuals, and (b) possible differences in the neural bases of
their altered processing across distinct pathological conditions, which
are considered exemplary of social cognitive impairments.
1.1 | Empathy
Despite different views on its core components, it is largely acknowl-
edged that empathy refers to grasping and sharing others' emotional
and sensory feelings, including pain (Wu et al., 2019) compassion
(Mercadillo, Diaz, Pasaye, & Barrios, 2011), embarrassment (Krach
et al., 2011), and exclusion (Beeney, Franklin Jr., Levy, & Adams
Jr., 2011), which however are perceived as distinct from one's own
ones (Bzdok et al., 2012). According to the perception-action model
of empathy (Preston & de Waal, 2017), emotional sharing and under-
standing entail an automatic simulation of others' experiences (Oliver,
Vieira, Neufeld, Dziobek, & Mitchell, 2018), promoting prosocial
behavior (Betti & Aglioti, 2016). This process relies on the fronto-
insular (Fallon, Roberts, & Stancak, 2020) and anterior cingulate (ACC)
cortex (Bernhardt & Singer, 2012; for a meta-analysis see Timmers
et al., 2018). Some studies, however, reported only insula activation
as fundamental for empathic processing (e.g., Grice-Jackson, Critchley,
Banissy, & Ward, 2017). Empathy processing is often associated with
the recruitment of further regions, such as pre- and postcentral gyri,
inferior parietal lobule (IPL), thalamus, and amygdala (Del Casale
et al., 2017), but with limited agreement on the role of these regions
in empathic resonance (e.g., Gu et al., 2012).
1.2 | Affective and cognitive mentalizing
The automatic sharing of others' experiences differentiates empathy
from mentalizing, the latter referring to representing another's mental
states, such as thoughts, desires, behavioral dispositions, and even
affective mental states, in terms of abstract inferences (Bzdok
et al., 2012). Grasping the content of other persons’ minds is key to
recognize that their knowledge is different from ours, to try to explain
and predict their actions, and eventually to influence their behavior by
manipulating their beliefs (Baker, Jara-Ettinger, Saxe, &
Tenenbaum, 2017). The core ToM network includes the medial pre-
frontal cortex (mPFC), precuneus, and temporoparietal junction (TPJ;
Schurz, Radua, Aichhorn, Richlan, & Perner, 2014), but other regions
are recruited when mentalizing, probably depending on contingent
features of experimental paradigms (e.g., Arioli, Gianelli, et al., 2020;
Lin et al., 2018; Spunt & Adolphs, 2014).
Much of the debate on the neural bases of mentalizing revolves
around the putative distinction between its affective and cognitive
sub-components (Molenberghs et al., 2016), referring to the ability to
make inferences about others' emotional versus cognitive mental
states, respectively (e.g., Schlaffke et al., 2015; Sebastian et al., 2012).
Cognitive mentalizing thus refers to the ability to make inferences
about beliefs and motivations, while affective mentalizing refers to
the ability to infer what a person is feeling (Sebastian et al., 2012).
To empirically differentiate performance on cognitive versus affective
mentalizing, researchers have developed several tasks, such as, for
example, the Yoni task (Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 2007) and
the Story-based Empathy task (SET; Dodich et al., 2015). These tasks
represent sensitive tools for detecting different dimensions of
mentalizing impairment, across different clinical conditions, supporting
the existence of two different mentalizing components (i.e., cognitive
and affective mentalizing; Cerami et al., 2014; Dodich et al., 2016;
Rossetto et al., 2018). Alongside the common involvement of the
precuneus and TPJ bilaterally (Sebastian et al., 2012), there is meta-
analytic evidence of specific activations for cognitive mentalizing in
the right TPJ and superior temporal sulcus, and for affective
mentalizing in the left orbitofrontal cortex, pars opercularis of the
inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), and ventral premotor cortex (vPMC;
Molenberghs et al., 2016). Other studies, however, reported other
regions as specifically associated with affective mentalizing, for exam-
ple, basal ganglia (Bodden et al., 2013), posterior cingulate cortex
(Schlaffke et al., 2015), and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC;
Sebastian et al., 2012). Interestingly, the aforementioned social tasks
successfully differentiate between cognitive and affective mentalizing
in individuals with lesions affecting circumscribed regions thought to
be related to those abilities (Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 2007).
1.3 | Mentalizing and empathy
Empathy represents a mirroring of the emotional response that is, living
“as if the same feelings or perceptions occurred to me,” on the other
hand, mentalizing involves a cognitive evaluation of the others' internal
state, such as thoughts and intentions for cognitive mentalizing, and
emotional feelings for affective mentalizing (Cerniglia et al., 2019). Cog-
nitive mentalizing involves inferences on other's cognitive mental states,
whereas affective mentalizing involves a cognitive understanding of
another person's emotional perspective, and empathy includes appropri-
ating and sharing these feelings, at least on a gross and more automatic
level (Dvash & Shamay-Tsoory, 2014). Although both affective
mentalizing and empathy involves emotional state understanding, there
is evidences (e.g., Gallant et al., 2020; Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz, &
Perry, 2009) showing the distinction between these two processes.
To date, only a few studies have addressed the possible relation-
ship between empathy, affective and cognitive mentalizing. While
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lesion-based evidence suggested that affective mentalizing requires
cognitive mentalizing and empathy (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009,
2010), this proposal has never been tested. Shamay-Tsoory
et al. (2010) suggests that affective mentalizing builds on the indepen-
dent contribution of the cognitive mentalizing and of the empathic
processing outputs. Based on this model, a deficit in empathy or cog-
nitive mentalizing should also be reflected in a deficit in affective
mentalizing, which depends on the other two components. Psycho-
pathic patients, with a deficit in empathy and affective mentalization,
present a clinical picture that supports this model (Shamay-Tsoory
et al., 2010).
An influential neuro-cognitive model suggests that empathy is
associated with fronto-insular cortex, ACC, and amygdala, while
cognitive mentalizing recruits the medial prefrontal cortex, STS, and
TPJ, with affective mentalizing specifically engaging the vmPFC
(Dvash & Shamay-Tsoory, 2014). To date, single studies have only
contrasted two (out of three) such constructs, for example, affective
versus cognitive mentalizing (Schlaffke et al., 2015) or empathy ver-
sus mentalizing (without distinguishing between affective and cog-
nitive ToM; Vollm et al., 2006). Therefore, the degree of overlap
versus segregation of their neural bases remains largely under-
investigated (e.g., Chen & Hong, 2018). By adopting a hierarchical
approach, Schurz et al. (2020) have shown the existence of three
distinct clusters (cognitive, affective, and intermediate) underlying
social cognitive processing. While these three clusters might under-
pin cognitive mentalizing, empathy, and affective mentalizing,
respectively, this hypothesis requires empirical support. Interest-
ingly, the intermediate cluster combines cognitive and affective pro-
cesses, as proposed by the Shamay-Tsoory et al.'s (2010) model.
These findings suggest that areas linked to the cognitive and affec-
tive clusters are functionally segregated in many task contexts, how-
ever, during intermediate tasks, cognitive and affective processes
operate conjointly to support the intermediate process (Schurz
et al., 2020).
An inherent limitation of this literature is represented by the con-
fusing and inconsistent definitions of the features and functions of
mentalizing and empathy systems. For instance, it has been suggested
that even empathy might comprise affective and cognitive sub-com-
ponents, with a putative “affective empathy” system supporting the
sharing or simulation of others' affective experiences, and a “cognitive
empathy” system associated with the abstract understanding of
others' mental states (Schurz et al., 2020). However, the latter might
be considered to overlap with the notion of mentalizing per se
(Dvash & Shamay-Tsoory, 2014), and more specifically with affective
mentalizing (Henry et al., 2016). Moreover, another crucial distinction
has been proposed between personal distress (i.e., affect arising in
response to others' suffering) and empathic care (i.e., responding to
others' distress with warmth and care) (Ashar, Andrews-Hanna,
Dimidjian, & Wager, 2017). Whether emotional responses that are pri-
marily self-oriented, such as personal distress, can be considered truly
empathic responses is, however, matter of debate (Henry et al., 2016).
In the light of these inconsistencies, in this work the term empa-
thy will be only referred to its affective component.
1.4 | Empathy and mentalizing impairments in SC
and autism
Mentalizing and empathy play a crucial role in social cognition, moral
reasoning, and prosocial behavior (Bzdok et al., 2012; Majdandzic,
Amashaufer, Hummer, Windischberger, & Lamm, 2016), and thus in
mental health and wellbeing (Henry et al., 2016). Autism spectrum dis-
order (ASD) and SC share social communication impairments para-
lleling defective mentalizing and empathic abilities (Tordjman, Celume,
Denis, Motillon, & Keromnes, 2019), alongside defective communica-
tion, and social interaction, particularly involving reduced facial
expression or body language, poor eye contact, and abnormal emo-
tional expression (Henry et al., 2016; Tordjman et al., 2019).
In the last edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for
Mental Disorders (DSM-5), SC is the only condition associated with a
mentalizing impairment, which additionally correlates with the sever-
ity of functional outcomes (Fett et al., 2011). Distinct tasks have
highlighted mentalizing impairments in SC, such as those requiring to
represent others' cognitive and emotional mental states (Russell
et al., 2000; Stanford, Messinger, Malaspina, & Corcoran, 2011), and
to identify social gaffes (FauxPas) (Hooker, Bruce, Lincoln, Fisher, &
Vinogradov, 2011). Patients' impaired performance in these tasks has
been related to a decreased activity in the superior temporal gyrus
and TPJ (Adamczyk et al., 2017; Lee, Horan, Wynn, & Green, 2016).
Although less investigated than mentalizing, also empathy processing
might be impaired in SC, particularly concerning emotion recognition
(Habel et al., 2010), affective responsiveness (Derntl, Seidel,
Schneider, & Habel, 2012), and altered neural responses to others'
affective cues (Harvey, Zaki, Lee, Ochsner, & Green, 2013; Singh
et al., 2015).
Conversely, altered empathic responses and maladaptive emo-
tional reactions have been often reported as core deficits in ASD
(Peterson, 2014), although not unanimously (Bernhardt et al., 2014).
ASD patients' decreased activity in response to emotional expressions
in core regions of the social brain, such as the fusiform gyrus and the
amygdala (Zalla & Sperduti, 2013), have been suggested to relate to
the avoidance of eye contact (Kliemann, Dziobek, Hatri, Baudewig, &
Heekeren, 2012). This proposal fits with the evidence of altered con-
nectivity between the amygdala and fusiform face area (FFA) in ASD
(e.g., Radua, Via, Catani, & Mataix-Cols, 2011), tracking the severity of
social impairment (Kleinhans et al., 2008). Mentalizing seems also to
be impaired in adults with ASD (Velikonja, Fett, & Velthorst, 2019).
Abnormal TPJ activity has been reported in autistic patients (Schütz
et al., 2020) in association with intention attribution (e.g., Schütz
et al., 2020) and both implicit and explicit false belief reasoning
(Nijhof, Bardi, Brass, & Wiersema, 2018).
The role played by empathy and mentalizing in social communica-
tion, and their frequent association with social anxiety (Spain, Sin, Lin-
der, MacMahon, & Happe, 2018), explain why a thorough
characterization of these constructs, their borders and relationships,
as well as their neural correlates in SC and autism, is critical for
designing treatments and assessing their effectiveness (Tordjman
et al., 2019). For example, if cognitive mentalizing is a prerequisite for
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affective mentalizing (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2010), assessing the for-
mer ability might be needed to evaluate the specificity of an impair-
ment in the latter. It is noteworthy, then, that none of the available
meta-analyses on the neural bases of social cognitive deficits in
autism distinguished between mentalizing and empathy. Furthermore,
unveiling the neural bases of empathy or mentalizing in pathological
conditions might help refining neurocognitive models of these crucial
building blocks of social cognition.
1.5 | Aim of the present study
The evidence reviewed above about empathy and mentalizing high-
lights several gaps concerning their common versus specific neural
bases. While Dvash and Shamay-Tsoory's (2014) model provides a
theoretical framework for their mutual relationships, empirical evi-
dence is needed to support, reject, or refine its main tenets. Here we
addressed this issue with distinct coordinate-based meta-analyses of
neuroimaging studies on empathy and both affective and cognitive
mentalizing in healthy individuals. We then extended this investiga-
tion to SC and autism to assess (a) whether altered social understand-
ing in these disorders involves regions belonging to the construct-
specific networks observed in healthy individuals; (b) whether the
neural bases of altered social cognitive abilities provides additional
cues into their mutual relationships. For instance, based on Shamay-
Tsoory et al.'s model (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009, 2010), defective
empathy or cognitive mentalizing should be expected to entail
impaired affective mentalizing.
We predicted to observe at least partially specific brain activa-
tions for the three subcomponents of social understanding under
investigation: (a) a cognitive component, engaged when mentalizing
requires abstract inference on others' cognitive mental states; (b) an
emotional empathy component, underpinning shared neural represen-
tations of others' emotional, motor, or somatosensory experiences;
(c) an intermediate process of affective mentalizing, whereby others'
affective mental states are coded in terms of abstract inferences in
addition to internal simulations (Schurz et al., 2020). Based on previ-
ous studies, we expected a prominent role of the dorsal and anterior/
ventral TPJ sector in, respectively, cognitive mentalizing and affective
mentalizing (Schurz et al., 2014). We expected also a specific role of
the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) in the cognitive proper
aspects of mentalizing, on the other hand, when the mentalizing pro-
cess involves emotional cues, we expected a vmPFC activation
(Sebastian et al., 2012). The anterior-middle cingulate cortex (exten-
ding caudally into the supplementary motor area [SMA]) and the
insula (extending into the IFG) are the key nodes of the interoceptive
awareness system, and they might underlie the neural representation
of both one's own and others' emotional states (Berntson &
Khalsa, 2021), thus we expected this specific activation pattern for
empathy tasks. Based on previous integrative reviews of social
cognitive impairments in these disorders (Henry et al., 2016), we addi-
tionally expected to observe prominent alterations of brain activity
associated with mentalizing and empathy in SC and autism,
respectively. In particular, we expected an abnormal activation in the
middle temporal gyrus (MTG) and TPJ during mentalizing task in
schizophrenic patients, as previously reported in other meta-analysis
addressing social understanding in this patients (Kronbichler et al.,
2017; Vucurovic, Caillies, & Kaladjian, 2020). Considering the litera-
ture on social brain dysfunctionality in individuals with autism spec-
trum, we expected abnormalities in the amygdala activation during
empathic processing (Peng et al., 2020). Based on Shamay-Tsoory
et al.'s model (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009, 2010), however, ASD
patients' empathic deficit is expected to also affect the ability to
understand other's affective mental states (i.e., affective mentalizing).
In fact, this model predicts that a deficit in empathy is also followed
by an abnormality in the affective mentalizing skills (see Section 1.3;
Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2010).
2 | MATERIALS AND METHODS
2.1 | Rationale of the meta-analytic approach
We aimed to identify the brain regions consistently associated with
the affective and cognitive facets of mentalizing (Molenberghs
et al., 2016), over and beyond the contribution of neural mechanisms
of empathic processing (Timmers et al., 2018). Based on previous evi-
dence of selective social cognitive impairments in SC (Horan &
Green, 2019) and autism (Sucksmith, Allison, Baron-Cohen,
Chakrabarti, & Hoekstra, 2013), we additionally addressed the neural
correlates of impaired mentalizing and empathic processing in these
two clinical populations.
This goal was pursued with ALE, a coordinate-based metaanalytic
approach using coordinates of peak locations to summarize and inte-
grate published findings (Turkeltaub, Eden, Jones, & Zeffiro, 2002).
Such as approach allows to overcome the typical limitations inherent
in single neuroimaging studies, for example, sensitivity to experimen-
tal and analytic procedures, lack of replication studies, as well as small
sample size (Carp, 2012). These constraints are known to increase the
likelihood of false negatives (Button et al., 2013), thus pushing
researchers toward procedures which, conversely, might promote
false positives (Eklund, Nichols, & Knutsson, 2016; Muller
et al., 2018).
First, we ran four separate ALE analyses addressing the neural
processing of mentalizing (not considering sub-components), cognitive
mentalizing, affective mentalizing and empathic processing in healthy
individuals. Conjunction and contrast analyses allowed to unveil both
common and specific activations across: (1) cognitive and affective
mentalizing, (2) mentalizing and empathic processing, (3) cognitive
mentalizing and empathic processing, and (4) affective mentalizing
and empathic processing. Finally, we ran four additional ALE analyses
comparing the neural bases of mentalizing or empathic processing
across healthy controls (HCs) and either schizophrenic or autistic
patients.
We aimed to investigate brain activations related to mentalizing
and empathy regardless of the input sensory modality (i.e., visual or
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auditory), the stimulus type (i.e., photos, videos, verbal materials,
sounds, etc.), and task (e.g., comprehension, attention, etc.). All the
inclusion criteria for each dataset were selected by the first author,
and then checked by the other authors. This procedure, entailing a
double check by independent investigators, was aimed to reduce the
chances of a selection bias (Muller et al., 2018).
2.2 | Literature search and study selection
2.2.1 | Neural bases of mentalizing
We started our survey of the relevant literature by searching for
“ToM fMRI” and “mentalizing fMRI” on Pubmed (https://www.ncbi.
nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/). After duplicate removal, a preliminary pool of
1,092 studies was first screened by title, and then by abstract. We
retained only those studies fulfilling the following selection criteria
(see Figure S1 for details on the procedure for study selection):
1. studies written in English language;
2. empirical fMRI studies, while excluding review and meta-analysis
studies and those employing other techniques, to ensure compara-
ble spatial and temporal resolution;
3. studies reporting whole-brain activation coordinates, rather than
regions of interest (ROIs) or results of small volume correction
(SVC). Studies based on ROIs or SVC should be excluded because
a prerequisite for fMRI meta-analyses is that convergence across
experiments is tested against a nullhypothesis of random spatial
associations across the entire brain, under the assumption that
each voxel has the same a priori chance of being activated
(Eickhoff, Bzdok, Laird, Kurth, & Fox, 2012; Muller et al., 2018);
4. studies including drug-free and nonclinical participants, to prevent
possible differences in brain activity associated with pharmacologi-
cal manipulations or neuro-psychiatric diseases other than those
under investigation;
5. studies with adult subjects (age range: 18–60 years);
6. studies requiring the understanding of others' beliefs, emotional states,
and intentions, while excluding those aimed to induce an affective
sharing and brain activity interpreted in terms of empathic resonance;
7. studies requiring participants to represent others' mental states by
adopting an intentional stance toward others, that is, by under-
standing their thoughts, emotional states, desires, intentions, and
future actions in terms of abstract inferences detached from a sen-
sory stimulation. Namely, we selected contrasts that were specifi-
cally aimed to elicit brain activations interpreted by the authors in
terms of “mentalizing or theory of mind network” associated with
the representation or attribution of mental states, that is: a) infer-
ences on mental states or intentions > inferences on physic or per-
ceptual aspects, or on literal meanings other than mental states; b)
attribution of emotional mental states > gender inferences (based
on Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, and Plumb's (2001)
“Reading the mind in the eyes” task); c) human
interactions > computer interactions, during interactive games.
Within the studies fulfilling these criteria, we retained only the
contrasts between conditions differing in terms of the requirement to
represent mental states.
Starting from an initial screening of 1,092 titles and abstracts,
622 papers deemed as potentially relevant were fully reviewed based
on the aforementioned selection criteria (see Figure S1). We thus
excluded: 134 review or meta-analysis articles; 43 studies employing
techniques other than fMRI; 30 studies using ROIs or SVC; 2 studies
explicitly focused on empathic processing; 41 studies focused on chil-
dren or aging populations; 33 studies not reporting all the required
information; 189 studies focused on clinical populations and 45 stud-
ies that did not focus on mentalizing.
We included studies fulfilling the above criteria regardless of:
(a) sensory modality (e.g., visual or auditory); (b) experimental para-
digm (e.g., comprehension or attentional tasks); (c) stimulus type
(e.g., videos, photos, and verbal materials). Our aim was indeed to pool
across different experimental paradigms to ensure both generalizabil-
ity and consistency of results, within the requirement of mentalizing
inherent in our research question (Radua & Mataix-Cols, 2012). This
selection phase resulted in 105 studies fulfilling our criteria.
We then expanded our search for other potentially relevant stud-
ies by carefully examining both the studies quoting, and those quoted
by, each of these papers, alongside previously published meta-
analyses on the neural bases of mentalizing (Bzdok et al., 2012;
Molenberghs et al., 2016; Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2009; van Veluw and
Chance, 2014). This second phase highlighted seven further studies
fitting our search criteria. Overall, this procedure led to include in the
ALE meta-analysis 112 previously published studies (see Table S1),
resulting from 113 experiments (individual comparisons reported)
with 2,295 subjects and 1,696 activation foci. Tasks were classified as
“affective” if they required participants to infer emotional mental
states, and “cognitive” if they involved understanding beliefs, inten-
tions or goals. In total, 412 activation foci from 26 experiments were
ascribed to affective mentalizing, and 1,272 activation foci from
93 experiments to cognitive mentalizing (see Table S1).
2.2.2 | Neural bases of empathy
We started our survey of the relevant literature by searching for
“empathy fMRI” and “empathic fMRI” on Pubmed (https://www.ncbi.
nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/) (see Figure S2). After duplicate removal, a pre-
liminary pool of 721 studies was first screened by title, and then by
abstract. While the methodological selection criteria were the same as
above (1–5), here we selected only studies reporting brain activations
interpreted by the authors as related to empathic processing. To this
purpose, we selected only:
6. studies aimed to elicit an affective sharing and brain activity
interpreted by the authors in terms of empathic resonance, rather
than mentalizing (i.e., representation, and attribution of mental
states);7. studies aimed to elicit the isomorphic experience of
another's affective state. Put differently, in these studies participants
were supposed to know and “feel into” another's experience. These
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studies employed mostly visual, and to a lesser extent auditory or tex-
tual, stimuli conveying emotional situations which participants
attended passively, or evaluated on various dimensions, without a
direct involvement. Namely, we selected studies requiring participants
to attend to another person's emotional state, and performing con-
trasts aimed to elicit brain activations interpreted by the authors in
terms of empathic processing, that is:a) direct comparison between
emotional stimuli and baseline/control stimuli (e.g., pain > no pain or
emotion > neutral in others);b) direct comparison between an empa-
thy task and a control task (e.g., brain activations highlighted by the
contrast between rating and counting painful stimuli);c) correlation
with trait empathy as measured by self-report questionnaires
(e.g., Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright's (2004) Empathy Quotient
(EQ));d) correlation with valence rating (e.g., pain or unpleasantness
ratings);e) observing other's exclusion, compared with inclusion, dur-
ing interactive games (e.g., cyberball game; Williams, Cheung, &
Choi, 2000).
Within the studies fulfilling these criteria, we retained only the
contrasts between conditions differing in terms of the requirement to
share another's emotional state. Thus, while mentalizing task required
to develop an abstract representation of characters' (affective and
cognitive) mental states, only in empathy task participants were sup-
posed to “feel into” another's feelings (emotions, pain, compas-
sion, etc.).
Starting from an initial screening of 721 titles and abstracts,
631 papers deemed as potentially relevant were fully reviewed
based on the aforementioned selection criteria (see Figure S2). We
thus excluded: 57 review or meta-analysis articles; 33 studies
employing techniques other than fMRI; 11 studies using ROIs or
SVC; 6 studies explicitly focused on mentalizing; 51 studies
focused on children or aging populations; 28 studies not reporting
all the required information; 204 studies focused on clinical
populations and 161 studies that did not focus on empathic
processing.
We included studies fulfilling the above criteria regardless of:
(a) sensory modality (e.g., visual or auditory), (b) experimental para-
digm (e.g., comprehension or attentional tasks), and (c) stimulus type
(e.g., videos, photos, and verbal materials). Our aim was indeed to pool
across different experimental paradigms to ensure both generalizabil-
ity and consistency of results, within the requirement of an empathic
processing inherent in our research question (Radua & Mataix-
Cols, 2012). This selection phase resulted in 80 studies fulfilling our
criteria.
We then expanded our search for other potentially relevant
studies by carefully examining both the studies quoting, and those
quoted by, each of these papers, alongside previously published
meta-analyses on the neural bases of empathic processing (Del Cas-
ale et al., 2017; Gu et al., 2012; Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 2011;
Timmers et al., 2018; Wu et al., 2019). This second phase
highlighted 10 further studies fitting our search criteria. Overall,
this procedure led to include in the ALE meta-analysis 90 previously
published studies (see Table S2), resulting from 90 experiments
(individual comparisons reported) with 2,230 subjects and 1,355
activation foci.
2.2.3 | Neural bases of mentalizing in SC patients
versus HCs
We started our survey of the relevant literature by searching for stud-
ies on SC patients in our database of 1,092 studies on the neural
bases of mentalizing (see Section 2.2.1). This search, resulting in
19 studies, was extended by carefully examining the studies included
in a recent meta-analysis on the neural bases of social cognition in SC
(Vucurovic et al., 2020; see Figure S3), which highlighted other 28 rele-
vant studies. After duplicate removal, the preliminary pool of 39 stud-
ies was first screened by title and then by abstract. While the
methodological selection criteria were the same as above (1–3), here
we selected only studies reporting stronger brain activations, inter-
preted by the authors as related to mentalizing, in HCs compared with
schizophrenic patients. To this purpose, we selected only:
4. studies reporting significantly different brain activation across
HCs and schizophrenic patients (HC > SC). In all the selected studies
SC patients had been diagnosed using the Structured Clinical Inter-
view for the Diagnostic (SCID), and/or following the clinical criteria
reported in the DSM-IV or DSM-IV-TR and/or in the Statistical Classi-
fication of Disease and Related Health Problems (ICD-10);
5. studies investigating brain activity related to representing
another's mental states (as described in Section 2.2.1). Namely, we
selected contrasts aimed to elicit brain activations interpreted in terms
of a “mentalizing or theory of mind network” underpinning the repre-
sentation or attribution of mental states.
Starting from an initial screening of 39 titles and abstracts, 24 papers
deemed as potentially relevant were fully reviewed based on the afore-
mentioned selection criteria (see Figure S3). We thus excluded: 1 study
employing techniques other than fMRI; 2 studies using ROIs or SVC and
6 studies explicitly focused on empathic processing.
We included studies fulfilling the above criteria regardless of:
(a) sensory modality (e.g., visual or auditory), (b) experimental para-
digm (e.g., comprehension or attentional tasks), and (c) stimulus type
(e.g., videos, photos, or verbal materials). Our aim was indeed to pool
across different experimental paradigms to ensure both generalizabil-
ity and consistency of results, within the requirement of mentalizing
in HCs compared with schizophrenic patients inherent in our research
question (Radua & Mataix-Cols, 2012). This selection phase resulted
in 15 studies fulfilling our criteria.
We then expanded our search for other potentially relevant studies
by carefully examining both the studies quoting, and those quoted by,
each of these papers. This second phase highlighted four further studies
fitting our search criteria. Overall, this procedure led to include in the ALE
meta-analysis 19 previously published studies (see Table S3), resulting
from 19 experiments (individual comparisons reported), with 305 HCs
compared to 292 schizophrenic patients (SC), and 145 activation foci.
2.2.4 | Neural bases of empathy in SC patients
versus HCs
We started our survey of the relevant literature by searching for stud-
ies on SC patients in our database of 721 studies on the neural bases
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of empathy (see Section 2.2.2). This search, resulting in 15 studies,
was extended by carefully examining the studies included in a recent
meta-analysis on the neural bases of social cognition in SC (Vucurovic
et al., 2020; see Figure S4), which highlighted other 28 relevant stud-
ies. After duplicate removal, this preliminary pool of 35 studies was
first screened by title, and then by abstract. While the methodological
selection criteria were the same as in Section 2.2.3 (1-4), here we
selected only studies reporting stronger brain activations, interpreted
by the authors as related to empathy, in HCs compared with schizo-
phrenic patients. To this purpose, we selected only:
5. studies investigating brain activity related to the isomorphic
experience of another's affective state (as described in Section 2.2.2).
Namely, we selected studies requiring participants to attend to
another person's emotional state, and performing contrasts aimed
to elicit brain activations interpreted in terms of empathic processing.
Starting from an initial screening of 35 titles and abstracts,
27 papers deemed as potentially relevant were fully reviewed based
on the aforementioned selection criteria (see Figure S4). We thus
excluded: 5 studies employing techniques other than fMRI; 13 studies
addressing processes other than empathy and 1 study explicitly
focused on mentalizing.
We included studies fulfilling the above criteria regardless of:
(a) sensory modality (e.g., visual or auditory), (b) experimental para-
digm (e.g., comprehension or self-other tasks), and (c) stimulus type
(e.g., videos, photos, or verbal materials). Our aim was indeed to pool
across different experimental paradigms to ensure both generalizabil-
ity and consistency of results, within the requirement of empathy in
HCs compared with schizophrenic patients inherent in our research
question (Radua & Mataix-Cols, 2012). This selection phase resulted
in eight studies fulfilling our criteria.
We then expanded our search for other potentially relevant stud-
ies by carefully examining both the studies quoting, and those quoted
by, each of these papers. This second phase highlighted nine further
studies fitting our search criteria. Overall, this procedure led to include
in the ALE meta-analysis 17 previously published studies (see
Table S4), resulting from 17 experiments (individual comparisons
reported), with 315 HCs compared to 324 schizophrenic patients (SC),
and 161 activation foci.
2.2.5 | Neural bases of mentalizing in autistic
patients versus HCs
We started our search of the relevant literature by searching for stud-
ies on autistic patients in our database of 1,092 studies on the neural
bases of mentalizing (see Section 2.2.1). This survey, resulting in
13 studies, was then expanded by searching for “autism theory of
mind fMRI” on Pubmed (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/) (see
Figure S5). After duplicate removal, a preliminary pool of 109 studies
was first screened by title, and then by abstract. While the methodo-
logical selection criteria are the same as in Section 2.2.4 (1-3), here we
selected only studies reporting stronger brain activations, interpreted
by the authors as related to empathic processing, in HCs compared
with autistic individuals. To this purpose, we selected only:
4. studies reporting significantly different brain activations across
HCs and autistic patients (HC > ASD). In keeping with previously pub-
lished meta-analyses on this disorder (e.g., Clements et al., 2018; Fer-
nandes, Cajao, Lopes, Jeronimo, & Barahona-Correa, 2018), we
included both studies on Autism and Asperger syndrome. All patients
were diagnosed using the Autism Diagnostic Observational Schedule
(ADOS; Lord et al., 2000) and/or the Autism Diagnostic Interview
(ADI or ADI-R; Lord, Rutter, & Le Couteur, 1994), and/or using the
clinical criteria reported in the DSM-IV or DSM-IV-TR, and/or in
the Statistical Classification of Disease and Related Health Problems
(ICD-10);
5. studies investigating brain activity related to representing
another's mental states (as described in Section 2.2.1). Namely, we
selected contrasts aimed to elicit brain activations interpreted in terms
of a “mentalizing” or “ToM” network underpinning the representation
or attribution of mental states.
Starting from an initial screening of 109 titles and abstracts,
30 papers deemed as potentially relevant were fully reviewed based
on the aforementioned selection criteria (see Figure S5). We thus
excluded: 2 review or meta-analysis articles; 2 studies employing
techniques other than fMRI; 1 study without autistic patients; 5 stud-
ies using ROIs or SVC and 13 studies focused on processes other than
mentalizing.
We included studies fulfilling the above criteria regardless of:
(a) sensory modality (e.g., visual or auditory), (b) experimental para-
digm (e.g., comprehension or attentional tasks), and (c) stimulus type
(e.g., videos, photos, or verbal materials). Our aim was indeed to pool
across different experimental paradigms to ensure both generalizabil-
ity and consistency of results, within the requirement of mentalizing
in autistic patients compared with HCs inherent in our research ques-
tion (Radua & Mataix-Cols, 2012). This selection phase resulted in
seven studies fulfilling our criteria.
We then expanded our search for other potentially relevant stud-
ies by carefully examining both the studies quoting, and those quoted
by, each of these papers. This second phase highlighted eight further
studies fitting our search criteria. Overall, this procedure led to include
in the ALE meta-analysis 15 previously published studies (see
Table S5), resulting from 15 experiments (individual comparisons
reported), with 280 HCs compared to 277 autistic patients (ASD), and
88 activation foci.
2.2.6 | Neural bases of empathic processing in
autistic patients versus HCs
We started our search of the relevant literature by searching for stud-
ies on autistic patients in our database of 721 studies on the neural
bases of empathic processing (see Section 2.2.2). This survey,
resulting in 18 studies, was then expanded by searching for “autism
empathy fMRI” on Pubmed (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/;
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see Figure S6). After duplicate removal, a preliminary pool of 64 stud-
ies was first screened by title, and then by abstract. While the meth-
odological selection criteria are the same as in Section 2.2.5 (1–4),
here we selected only studies reporting stronger brain activations,
interpreted by the authors as related to empathic processing, in HCs
compared with autistic individuals. To this purpose, we selected only:
5. studies investigating brain activity related to the isomorphic
experience of another's affective state (as described in Section 2.2.2).
Namely, we selected studies requiring participants to attend to
another person's emotional state, and performing contrasts aimed
to elicit brain activations interpreted in terms of empathic processing.
Starting from an initial screening of 64 titles and abstracts,
37 papers deemed as potentially relevant were fully reviewed based
on the aforementioned selection criteria (see Figure S6). We thus
excluded: 1 review or meta-analysis article; 5 studies employing tech-
niques other than fMRI; 3 studies without autistic patients and
14 studies explicitly focused on mentalizing.
We included studies fulfilling the above criteria regardless of:
(a) sensory modality (e.g., visual or auditory), (b) experimental para-
digm (e.g., comprehension or attentional tasks), (c) stimulus type
(e.g., videos, photos, or verbal materials). Our aim was indeed to pool
across different experimental paradigms to ensure both generalizabil-
ity and consistency of results, within the requirement of empathic
processing in autistic patients compared with HCs inherent in our
research question (Radua & Mataix-Cols, 2012). This selection phase
resulted in 14 studies fulfilling our criteria.
We then expanded our search for other potentially relevant stud-
ies by carefully examining both the studies quoting, and those quoted
by, each of these papers. This second phase highlighted four further
studies fitting our search criteria. Overall, this procedure led to include
in the ALE meta-analysis 18 previously published studies (see
Table S6), resulting from 18 experiments (individual comparisons
reported) with 317 HCs compared to 289 autistic patients (ASD), and
92 activation foci.
2.3 | Activation likelihood estimation
We performed six distinct ALE analyses, using the GingerALE 3.0.2
software (Eickhoff et al., 2009), to identify regions consistently associ-
ated with: (1) mentalizing, (2) affective mentalizing, (3) cognitive
mentalizing, (4) empathic processing, (5, 6) mentalizing and empathic
processing in HCs compared with SC patients, (7, 8) mentalizing and
empathic processing in autistic patients compared with HCs. We
followed the analytic approach previously described by Arioli, Gianelli,
et al. (2020), Arioli, Ricciardi, et al. (2020) and Arioli and
Canessa (2019), based on Eickhoff et al. (2012). Importantly, the inclu-
sion of multiple contrasts/experiments from the same set of subjects
can generate dependence across experiment maps and thus decrease
the validity of meta-analytic results. To prevent this issue, for each
meta-analysis we adjusted for within-group effects by pooling the
coordinates from all the relevant contrasts of a study into one experi-
ment (Turkeltaub et al., 2002). The number of studies included in most
of these meta-analyses is in line with the recent prescriptions for ALE
(Eickhoff et al., 2016; Muller et al., 2018), suggesting a minimum of
17 studies to ensure that results would not be driven by single experi-
ments (see also Wu et al., 2019). Only in one analysis (i.e., mentalizing
in HC versus ASD) we included less than 17 studies. However, our
database is similar to those previously used by van Veluw and
Chance (2014) and Wu et al. (2019) in previous meta-analyses
addressing social processing.
In all meta-analyses, activation foci were initially interpreted as
the centers of three-dimensional Gaussian probability distributions, to
capture the spatial uncertainty associated with each individual coordi-
nate. All coordinates were reported or converted into MNI space,
using the automatic routine implemented in GingerALE. The three-
dimensional probabilities of all activation foci in a given experiment
were then combined for each voxel, resulting in a modeled activation
(MA) map. The union of these maps produces ALE scores describing
the convergence of results at each brain voxel (Turkeltaub
et al., 2002). To distinguish “true” convergence across studies from
random convergence (i.e., noise), the ALE scores are compared with
an empirically defined null distribution (Eickhoff et al., 2012). The lat-
ter reflects a random spatial association between experiments, with
the within-experiment distribution of foci being treated as a fixed
property. A random-effects inference is thus invoked, by focusing on
the above-chance convergence between different experiments, and
not on the clustering of foci within a specific experiment. From a com-
putational standpoint, deriving this null hypothesis involved sampling
a voxel at random from each MA map, and taking the union of the
resulting values. The ALE score obtained under this assumption of
spatial independence was recorded, and the permutation procedure
iterated 100 times to obtain a sufficient sample of the ALE null distri-
bution. The “true” ALE scores were tested against the ALE scores
obtained under the null distribution and thresholded at p <.05,
corrected for cluster-level family wise error (FWE), and the cluster
level threshold was set at p <.05, to identify above-chance conver-
gence in each analysis (Eickhoff et al., 2012).
The resulting maps were then fed into direct comparisons and
conjunction analyses, within GingerALE, to unveil the common
and specific brain activations between: (1) cognitive mentalizing and
affective mentalizing, (2) mentalizing and empathic processing, (3) cog-
nitive mentalizing and empathic processing, and (4) affective
mentalizing and empathic processing. For each comparison, a conjunc-
tion image was created, using the voxel-wise minimum value of the
included ALE images, to display the similarity between datasets
(Eickhoff et al., 2011). In the same analysis, two ALE contrast images
were created and compared by directly subtracting one input image
from the other. To correct for sampling errors, GingerALE creates
such data by pooling the foci in each dataset and randomly dividing
them into two new groupings equivalent in size to the original
datasets. An ALE image is created for each new dataset, then sub-
tracted from the other and compared with the true data. Permutation
calculations are then used to compute a voxel-wise p-value image
indicating where the values of the “true data” fall within the distribu-
tion of values in any single voxel. To simplify the interpretation of ALE
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contrast images, significant ALE subtraction scores were converted to
Z scores. For contrast analyses, we used a threshold set at p <.05,
using 10,000 permutations, and minimum volume size of 100 mm3.
3 | RESULTS
3.1 | Mentalizing
Activations associated with the neural processing of mental states
encompassed the precuneus and the posterior portion of the MTG
bilaterally, extending in the inferior temporal gyrus in the left hemi-
sphere, and in the superior temporal gyrus and TPJ in the right
hemisphere. Further activations involved the right temporal pole, the
inferior and middle frontal gyri bilaterally, and the dmPFC (see
Figure 1a and Table 1).
3.2 | Cognitive mentalizing
Cognitive mentalizing recruited the precuneus and the posterior sec-
tor of superior and middle temporal cortex, extending into the TPJ
bilaterally, alongside more rostral sectors of the temporal lobe
encompassing the left inferior temporal gyrus and right temporal pole.
The left inferior and middle frontal cortex was also activated, along-
side the SMA and both the dmPFC and vmPFC (see Figure 1b and
Table 2).
3.3 | Affective mentalizing
Making inferences on others' affective states reflected in consistent
activations in the MTG bilaterally and left TPJ, alongside the
precuneus bilaterally. In the frontal lobe, the SMA and the inferior and
superior frontal cortex were also recruited by affective mentalizing
(see Figure 1c and Table 3).
3.4 | Affective and cognitive mentalizing
Common brain activations to affective and cognitive mentalizing were
observed in distinct sectors of the left middle temporal and
temporoparietal cortex, IFG bilaterally, alongside the SMA and the
dmPFC (see Figure 2a and Table 4). Representing another's affective,
compared with cognitive, mental states was associated with stronger
activity in the left superior temporal pole and TPJ, MTG bilaterally,
alongside the IFG bilaterally, left premotor cortex and SMA (see
Figure 2a and Table 4). The reverse contrast showed that cognitive,
compared with affective, mentalizing recruited the medial precuneus,
the posterior sector of the MTG and the TPJ bilaterally, alongside the
anterior sector of the left superior temporal cortex and the dmPFC
(see Figure 2a and Table 4).
3.5 | Empathy
Tasks requiring an empathic processing elicited consistent bilateral
activations in the frontoinsular cortex (including anterior insula, IFG,
and vPMC), alongside a cluster encompassing the middle and ACC.
The right postcentral and inferior temporal gyri, and the left sup-
ramarginal gyrus, were also activated, alongside the thalamus bilater-
ally (see Figure 1d and Table 5).
3.6 | Mentalizing and empathy
A conjunction analysis highlighted commonly activated regions across
empathic processing and mentalizing in the right MTG and IFG
F IGURE 1 Brain activations associated with mentalizing,
cognitive mentalizing, affective mentalizing, and empathy in healthy
individuals, resulting from the ALE analyses. From top to bottom, the
figure reports the brain structures consistently associated with
processing others' mental states (mentalizing, network, red), others'
cognitive mental states (cognitive mentalizing network, violet), others'
affective mental states (affective mentalizing, green), as well as with
empathic processing (empathy network, blue). All the reported
clusters survived a statistical threshold of p <.05, corrected for
cluster-level family wise error (FWE). The color bar indicates
consistent brain activity intensity
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TABLE 1 Neural bases of mentalizing
Cluster # Cluster size (mm3) Brain region x y z
2 13,216 Medial superior frontal gyrus 0 56 28
8 4,800 Medial superior and posterior frontal gyrus 0 28 40
10 2,432 Left precentral gyrus 36 4 46
Left middle frontal gyrus 44 12 36
11 1,280 Right precentral gyrus/right middle frontal gyrus 44 8 48
7 6,288 Left inferior frontal gyrus pars orbitalis 46 26 10
Left inferior frontal gyrus pars triangularis 54 24 10
6 6,736 Right inferior frontal gyrus pars triangularis 56 28 6
9 3,600 Medial prefrontal cortex 6 50 4
3 9,872 Right middle and superior temporal gyri 54 52 20
Right temporoparietal junction 52 54 24
5 7,976 Right middle temporal gyrus 62 24 10
Right middle temporal pole 52 8 30
1 21,888 Left middle temporal gyrus 58 42 4
Left inferior temporal gyrus 46 10 36
4 9,104 Medial precuneus 2 54 36
Note: From left to right, the table reports the size (in mm3), stereotaxic coordinates of local maxima, and anatomical labeling of the clusters which were
consistently associated with mentalizing. All the reported clusters survived a statistical threshold of p <.05, corrected for cluster-level family wise
error (FWE).
TABLE 2 Neural bases of cognitive mentalizing
Cluster # Cluster size (mm3) Brain region x y z
1 14,376 Medial superior frontal gyrus 2 56 28
Supplementary motor area 4 14 58
9 1,440 Left precentral gyrus 36 4 46
Left inferior frontal gyrus 46 16 36
Left middle frontal gyrus 42 12 48
11 1,112 Right precentral gyrus 44 8 46
8 3,248 Medial prefrontal cortex 6 50 6
10 1,152 Left inferior frontal gyrus 48 24 10
7 3,784 Right inferior frontal gyrus pars triangularis 56 26 6
Right inferior frontal gyrus pars orbitalis 48 32 2
4 8,848 Left superior temporal gyrus/left temporo-parietal junction 50 60 24
5 8,256 Left middle temporal gyrus 56 10 16
Left inferior temporal gyrus 52 6 28
6 5,888 Right middle temporal pole 50 8 30
Right middle temporal gyrus 60 10 18
2 10,344 Right middle temporal gyrus 54 54 20
Right superior temporal gyrus/right temporoparietal junction 52 54 24
Right middle occipital gyrus 48 70 8
3 9,344 Left precuneus 2 56 34
Note: From left to right, the table reports the size (in mm3), stereotaxic coordinates of local maxima, and anatomical labeling of the clusters which were
consistently associated with cognitive mentalizing. All the reported clusters survived a statistical threshold of p <.05, corrected for cluster-level family wise
error (FWE).
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bilaterally, as well as in the mPFC and SMA (see Figure 2b and
Table 6). Direct comparisons revealed activations specific to
mentalizing in the left precuneus and MTG bilaterally, in the right TPJ,
as well as in the dmPFC, left IFG, and both middle and superior frontal
gyri bilaterally (see Figure 2b and Table 6). Instead, activations specific
to an empathic processing were found in the fronto-insular cortex
TABLE 3 Neural bases of affective mentalizing
Cluster # Cluster size (mm3) Brain region x y z
3 3,416 Medial supplementary motor area 4 16 56
4 2,648 Left superior frontal gyrus 8 56 36
Medial superior frontal gyrus 6 58 24
5 1,384 Left precuneus 4 54 36
Right precuneus/right superior frontal gyrus 8 52 28
2 4,840 Left inferior frontal gyrus pars orbitalis 46 26 10
Left inferior frontal gyrus pars triangularis 50 18 24
6 1,296 Right inferior frontal gyrus pars triangularis 58 24 16
1 5,240 Left middle temporal gyrus/left temporoparietal junction 52 38 4
8 784 Right middle temporal gyrus 52 36 2
7 824 Right inferior occipital gyrus 30 94 4
Note: From left to right, the table reports the size (in mm3), stereotaxic coordinates of local maxima, and anatomical labeling of the clusters which were
consistently associated with affective mentalizing. All the reported clusters survived a statistical threshold of p <.05, corrected for cluster-level family wise
error (FWE).




and empathy networks in healthy
individuals, resulting from the
ALE analyses. From top to
bottom, the figure depicts with
different colors the common and
specific brain structures across
cognitive mentalizing and
affective mentalizing (a),
mentalizing and empathy (b),
cognitive mentalizing and
empathy (c), as well as affective
mentalizing and empathy (d). All
the reported clusters survived a
statistical threshold of p <.05 and
minimum volume size of
100 mm3. AffM, affective
mentalizing; CogM, cognitive
mentalizing; and Emp, empathy
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bilaterally, alongside the ACC and the SMA in the medial wall. Further
empathy-related activations involved the postcentral gyrus, extending
into the supramarginal gyrus, as well as the inferior temporal cortex
and the thalamus bilaterally (see Figure 2b and Table 6).
3.7 | Cognitive mentalizing and empathy
Common activations to empathy and cognitive mentalizing were iden-
tified in the right MTG and IFG bilaterally, as well as in a cluster
TABLE 4 Common and specific regions across the cognitive and affective mentalizing networks
Cognitive & affective mentalizing
Cluster # Cluster size (mm3) Brain region x y z
1 2,312 Left superior frontal gyrus 8 56 36
Medial superior frontal gyrus 6 58 24
3 1,320 Medial precuneus 4 54 36
Right superior frontal gyrus 8 52 28
4 1,064 Left inferior frontal gyrus pars orbitalis 48 24 10
6 704 Right inferior frontal gyrus pars triangularis 56 26 18
7 472 Supplementary motor area 4 14 58
2 1,576 Left middle temporal gyrus/left temporoparietal junction 56 58 20
5 744 Left middle temporal gyrus 52 36 4
Affective theory of mind > cognitive mentalizing
Cluster # Cluster size (mm3) Brain region x y z
3 3,320 Supplementary motor area 2 22 60
Supplementary motor area 8 14 46
1 4,304 Left inferior frontal gyrus pars orbitalis 46 28 8
Left inferior frontal gyrus pars triangularis 52 32 2
Left inferior frontal gyrus pars opercularis 52 14 22
6 648 Right inferior frontal gyrus pars opercularis 58 22 14
Right inferior frontal gyrus pars triangularis 56 20 24
7 432 Left superior frontal gyrus 8 56 38
9 200 Left precentral gyrus 42 8 38
10 128 Left superior temporal pole 50 8 20
11 104 Left superior temporal pole 58 20 4
2 3,880 Left middle temporal gyrus/left temporoparietal junction 55 48 8
5 776 Right middle temporal gyrus 48 38 2
8 328 Left cuneus 10 62 22
4 816 Right inferior occipital gyrus 32 94 10
Cognitive mentalizing > affective mentalizing
Cluster # Cluster size (mm3) Brain region x y z
4 920 Medial superior frontal gyrus 4 44 42
6 104 Left superior temporal gyrus 52 8 6
Left middle temporal gyrus 50 10 10
1 4,472 Left middle temporal gyrus/left temporoparietal junction 45 65 23
2 2,240 Right middle temporal gyrus/right temporoparietal junction 48 66 12
Right angular gyrus 54 50 34
5 192 Right middle temporal gyrus 60 22 11
3 2,024 Medial precuneus 4 58 46
Left cuneus 10 60 21
Note: From left to right, the table reports the size (in mm3), stereotaxic coordinates of local maxima, and anatomical labeling of the clusters which were
commonly (top) and specifically (bottom) associated with the cognitive and affective mentalizing networks. All the reported clusters survived a statistical
threshold of p <.05 and minimum volume size of 100 mm3.
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encompassing the SMA and dmPFC (see Figure 2c and Table 7). Com-
pared with empathic processing, cognitive mentalizing was associated
with stronger bilateral activity in both the posterior and anterior sec-
tors of middle temporal gyrus, as well as in the right superior temporal
gyrus and TPJ, inferior and middle frontal cortex, alongside the
dmPFC (see Figure 2c and Table 7). The reverse comparison
highlighted stronger bilateral activity for empathic processing than
mentalizing in the supramarginal gyrus, inferior frontal, and precentral
gyri, anterior insula and ACC, alongside the caudate (see Figure 2c
and Table 7).
3.8 | Affective mentalizing and empathy
A conjunction analysis unveiled common activity across affective
mentalizing and empathic processing in the SMA and left IFG (see
Figure 2d and Table 8). Compared with empathic processing, affec-
tive mentalizing elicited stronger activity in the precuneus, middle
temporal and inferior frontal gyri bilaterally, SMA, and dmPFC (see
Figure 2d and Table 8). Conversely, empathic processing was asso-
ciated with greater bilateral activity in the supramarginal and mid-
dle temporal gyri, anterior insula, and middle-ACC, alongside the
left precentral and right postcentral gyri (see Figure 2d and
Table 8).
3.9 | Mentalizing and empathic processing in SC
patients
Compared with controls, schizophrenic patients displayed decreased
activity in the left MTG in association with mentalizing tasks (see
Figure 3 and Table 9). Instead, no significant difference between SC
patients and controls was found in association with empathic
processing.
3.10 | Mentalizing and empathic processing in
autistic patients
Compared with controls, autistic patients displayed decreased activity
of the left posterior MTG (Figure 3 and Table 10) and right para-
hippocampal gyrus (Figure 3 and Table 11) in association with
mentalizing and empathic processing, respectively.
4 | DISCUSSION
Over two decades of neuroimaging and behavioral research have pro-
duced considerable evidence, and a variety of theoretical perspec-
tives, on the neurocognitive processes underlying the human ability to
TABLE 5 Neural bases of empathic processing
Cluster # Cluster size (mm3) Brain region x y z
1 11,384 Left insula 30 22 6
Left inferior frontal gyrus pars opercularis 54 8 20
Left precentral gyrus 56 10 24
Left inferior frontal gyrus pars orbitalis 38 26 2
3 4,864 Right insula 42 10 0
Right inferior frontal gyrus pars triangularis 52 30 0
9 1,280 Right inferior frontal gyrus pars opercularis 54 10 18
Right precentral gyrus 48 6 30
2 9,176 Middle cingulate gyrus 4 14 44
Right cingulate gyrus 8 24 34
Right supplementary motor area 8 12 52
Middle supplementary motor area 6 12 62
7 1,720 Right inferior temporal gyrus 48 66 2
Right fusiform gyrus 44 60 8
5 3,416 Right postcentral gyrus 62 20 36
4 4,840 Left supramarginal gyrus 58 26 36
6 2,296 Left inferior occipital gyrus 46 68 4
8 1,520 Left thalamus 10 12 8
Right thalamus 10 18 10
Note: From left to right, the table reports the size (in mm3), stereotaxic coordinates of local maxima, and anatomical labeling of the clusters which were
consistently associated with empathic processing. All the reported clusters survived a statistical threshold of p <.05, corrected for cluster-level family wise
error (FWE).
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TABLE 6 Common and specific regions across the mentalizing and empathy networks
Mentalizing & empathy
Cluster # Cluster size (mm3) Brain region x y z
3 264 Medial superior frontal gyrus 2 28 38
1 1,368 Medial supplementary motor area 4 18 50
2 376 Left inferior frontal gyrus pars orbitalis 42 24 4
4 240 Right inferior frontal gyrus pars triangularis 52 30 0
5 16 Right middle temporal gyrus 48 70 4
Mentalizing > empathy
Cluster # Cluster size (mm3) Brain region x y z
2 9,040 Medial superior frontal gyrus 5 57 36
Left superior frontal gyrus 20 56 30
Right superior frontal gyrus 11 55 28
11 776 Left superior and posterior frontal gyrus 6 26 60
13 144 Medial superior frontal gyrus 2 30 46
8 2,168 Medial middle frontal gyrus 0 56 10
Left middle frontal gyrus 10 50 4
9 1,464 Left precentral gyrus 40 10 44
Left middle frontal gyrus 46 14 44
10 952 Right middle frontal gyrus 40 8 53
6 3,688 Left inferior frontal gyrus pars triangularis 57 24 10
Left inferior frontal gyrus pars orbitalis 50 28 7
7 3,584 Right inferior frontal pars triangularis 57 29 26
1 18,912 Left middle temporal gyrus 54 39 4
3 8,200 Right middle temporal gyrus/right temporoparietal junction 54 56 22
5 5,488 Right middle temporal gyrus 56 32 4
Right middle temporal pole 54 12 32
4 8,200 Left precuneus 2 55 37
12 208 Left caudate/putamen 13 8 10
Empathy > mentalizing
Cluster # Cluster size (mm3) Brain region x y z
1 8,424 Left insula 38 6 1
Left inferior frontal gyrus pars opercularis 48 13 16
4 3,472 Right insula 36 22 8
10 224 Left inferior frontal gyrus pars orbitalis 30 28 10
7 1,192 Right inferior frontal gyrus pars opercularis 58 9 21
Right precentral gyrus 48 4 28
2 5,816 Left cingulate gyrus 4 14 41
Medial supplementary motor area 0 9 45
Right supplementary motor area 12 12 48
Right anterior cingulate gyrus 8 24 28
Left anterior cingulate gyrus 8 26 30
6 2,168 Left inferior temporal gyrus 48 67 4
8 744 Right fusiform gyrus 50 70 8
Right inferior temporal gyrus 54 66 10
Right middle temporal gyrus 48 64 0
3 4,840 Left supramarginal gyrus 59 24 31
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understand other minds. The increase of available knowledge, how-
ever, has paralleled a growing awareness of several inconsistent views
about fundamental issues such as the classification of distinct pro-
cesses of social understanding, their definitions and, even more
important, their common and/or specific neuro-cognitive bases
(Happe et al., 2017; Schaafsma, Pfaff, Spunt, & Adolphs, 2015;
Spunt & Adolphs, 2017). While the discussion on the building blocks
of social understanding mainly revolves around the notions of empa-
thy, affective mentalizing, and cognitive mentalizing, their degree of
overlap versus specificity is still debated (Cerniglia et al., 2019). We
investigated for the first time their common versus specific neural cor-
relates via a coordinate-based meta-analytic approach highlighting
both the most consistent activations in HCs, and the most consistent
alterations of brain activity in two disorders characterized by marked
social communicative impairments such as SC and autism.
4.1 | Neural bases of mentalizing and empathy
The present results provide novel evidence for the existence of two
distinct networks of areas associated with mentalizing and empathy.
Processing others' mental states in terms of abstract inferences was
associated with the consistent engagement of the mPFC and
precuneus in the midline, alongside the middle and superior temporal
gyri, extending into the TPJ, bilaterally (Arioli & Canessa, 2019;
Molenberghs et al., 2016; van Veluw and Chance, 2014). A consider-
able literature provided cues into the role of the key nodes of this net-
work, and particularly the dmPFC, previously associated with
perspective-taking and episodic memory retrieval (Geiger et al., 2019),
and the pSTS, involved in coding biological motion alongside the
underlying intentionality (Dasgupta, Tyler, Wicks, Srinivasan, &
Grossman, 2017) and social significance (Arioli, Basso, Poggi,
et al., 2021). A critical question concerns whether these regions play a
unique role in processing goals and intentions (Gao, Geng, Li, Zhou, &
Yao, 2018), or rather underpin more basic functions required by
mentalizing. According to the former view, TPJ might underpin tran-
sient mental inferences about people such as their goals, desires and
beliefs (Lamm, Batson, & Decety, 2007; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003),
whereas the mPFC would subserve the attribution of more general
traits and qualities about the self and other people (Van
Overwalle, 2009). However, the recruitment of temporoparietal
regions by tasks involving the reorientation of attention and a sense
of agency (Sperduti, Delaveau, Fossati, & Nadel, 2011) has prompted
an alternative—and controversial (e.g., Geng & Vossel, 2013)—
interpretation of their role in terms of attentional reorienting (Dugue,
Merriam, Heeger, & Carrasco, 2018). Based on recent evidence of its
involvement in processing the polarity, complexity and intensity of
the emotional experience (Lettieri et al., 2019), TPJ might also contrib-
ute to mentalizing by generating abstract representations of emotions,
which might then underpin the coding of perceived affective states
as—for instance—pleasant, unpleasant or ambivalent. Finally, the
precuneus has been suggested to underpin the construction of differ-
ent perspectives during social mentalizing tasks, through mental imag-
ery supported by episodic memory retrieval and autobiographical
memory (Hebscher, Levine, & Gilboa, 2018; Schurz et al., 2020).
Interestingly, the aforementioned regions largely overlap with the
key nodes of the default mode network (DMN). While being tradition-
ally considered an “intrinsic” system associated with internally oriented
cognitive processes such as self-referential thinking, daydreaming,
reminiscing and future planning (Raichle, 2015), the DMN also
appears to be involved in thinking about other people's beliefs, inten-
tions and motivations (Yeshurun, Nguyen, & Hasson, 2021). In this
view, the DMN contributes to representing mental states by under-
pinning the retrieval of a pool of prior experiences, which support the
interpretation of affects and beliefs in the light of the current context
(Mars et al., 2012). This process involves abstraction skills, which the
DMN is well-suited to support based on its structural and functional
connectivity (FC; Finlay & Uchiyama, 2015; Satpute &
Lindquist, 2019). If the DMN plays a key role in enabling abstraction,
its involvement should be decreased when the latter is less needed to
represent mental representation. This would be the case of the
empathic response, in which the understanding of others' experiences
is mediated by emotional sharing rather than abstract inferences.
Indeed, tasks tapping an empathic processing consistently rec-
ruited other brain regions, such as anterior-middle cingulate, fronto-
insular and postcentral regions, which seem to underpin the multiple
facets of sharing others' experiences (Timmers et al., 2018). The
anterior-middle cingulate cortex (extending caudally into the SMA)
TABLE 6 (Continued)
Empathy > mentalizing
Cluster # Cluster size (mm3) Brain region x y z
5 3,408 Right postcentral gyrus 60 19 35
Right supramarginal gyrus 58 32 36
9 272 Right thalamus 10 14 8
Left thalamus 12 6 8
11 112 Right caudate 8 10 2
Note: From left to right, the table reports the size (in mm3), stereotaxic coordinates of local maxima, and anatomical labeling of the clusters which were
commonly (top) and specifically (bottom) associated with the mentalizing and empathy networks. All the reported clusters survived a statistical threshold of
p <.05 and minimum volume size of 100 mm3.
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TABLE 7 Common and specific regions across the cognitive mentalizing and empathy networks
Cognitive mentalizing & empathy
Cluster # Cluster size (mm3) Brain region x y z
1 384 Supplementary motor area 4 22 50
6 8 Medial supplementary motor area 2 14 58
2 176 Medial superior frontal gyrus 0 26 38
4 112 Left inferior frontal gyrus pars orbitalis 44 22 10
3 128 Right inferior frontal gyrus pars orbitalis 50 30 2
Right inferior frontal gyrus pars triangularis 54 26 2
5 16 Right middle occipital gyrus 48 70 4
Cognitive mentalizing > empathy
Cluster # Cluster size (mm3) Brain region x y z
2 8,688 Medial superior frontal gyrus 3 58 36
Left superior frontal gyrus 18 56 32
Right middle frontal gyrus 6 52 8
Right prefrontal cortex 10 52 14
3 8,400 Medial superior frontal gyrus/medial precuneus 3 56 38
9 864 Left middle frontal gyrus 44 14 44
Left precentral gyrus 40 10 44
Left inferior frontal gyrus pars opercularis 42 16 34
10 864 Right middle frontal gyrus 40 6 54
12 160 Left inferior frontal gyrus pars orbitalis 52 26 8
11 216 Right inferior frontal gyrus pars triangularis 52 26 10
8 1,312 Right inferior frontal gyrus pars triangularis 55 29 28
Right inferior frontal gyrus pars opercularis 48 22 32
7 2,008 Medial anterior cingulate 4 56 12
Medial frontal gyrus 0 56 10
Left anterior cingulate 10 48 4
4 7,648 Left middle temporal gyrus 57 20 10
5 7,360 Left middle temporal gyrus 49 64 24
6 3,992 Right middle temporal gyrus 62 28 8
Right inferior temporal gyrus 58 16 20
1 8,696 Right middle and superior temporal gyrus/right
temporoparietal junction
54 56 22
Right angular gyrus 54 52 30
Empathy > cognitive mentalizing
Cluster # Cluster size (mm3) Brain region x y z
1 8,104 Left insula 39 17 8
Left precentral gyrus 54 7 15
4 3,376 Right insula 36 22 8
2 6,128 Medial supplementary motor area 0 12 46
Left anterior cingulate 7 28 26
Right anterior cingulate 10 24 28
12 104 Left inferior frontal gyrus pars orbitalis 30 28 10
7 1,192 Right inferior frontal gyrus pars opercularis 59 11 13
Right precentral gyrus 46 2 34
9 440 Right fusiform gyrus 48 70 8
Right middle temporal gyrus 44 64 0
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TABLE 7 (Continued)
Empathy > cognitive mentalizing
Cluster # Cluster size (mm3) Brain region x y z
3 4,840 Left supramarginal gyrus 59 23 31
5 3,368 Right supramarginal gyrus 60 19 35
6 2,080 Left inferior occipital gyrus 49 68 4
8 472 Left thalamus 16 16 8
10 200 Right thalamus 10 12 8
11 168 Right caudate 10 10 0
Note: From left to right, the table reports the size (in mm3), stereotaxic coordinates of local maxima, and anatomical labeling of the clusters which were
commonly (top) and specifically (bottom) associated with the cognitive mentalizing and empathy networks. All the reported clusters survived a statistical
threshold of p <.05 and minimum volume size of 100 mm3.
TABLE 8 Common and specific regions across the affective mentalizing and empathy networks
Affective mentalizing & empathy
Cluster # Cluster size (mm3) Brain region x y z
1 1,520 Medial supplementary motor area 4 18 54
2 232 Left inferior frontal gyrus pars orbitalis 44 22 8
Affective mentalizing > empathy
Cluster # Cluster size (mm3) Brain region x y z
3 2,368 Medial supplementary motor area 7 21 59
4 2,328 Left superior frontal gyrus 8 57 38
Medial superior frontal gyrus 5 59 23
2 4,568 Left inferior frontal gyrus pars orbitalis 49 29 8
Left inferior frontal gyrus pars triangularis 53 24 9
5 1,280 Right inferior frontal gyrus pars triangularis 58 26 22
1 5,096 Left middle temporal gyrus 56 45 4
7 712 Right middle temporal gyrus 51 36 5
6 1,264 Left precuneus 7 58 39
Medial precuneus 4 54 40
Right precuneus 7 51 30
8 488 Right lingual gyrus 29 98 1
9 120 Right inferior frontalal gyrus 58 32 4
Empathy > affective mentalizing
Cluster # Cluster size (mm3) Brain region x y z
1 5,256 Left insula 40 7 1
4 2,480 Right insula 41 11 1
8 944 Left precentral gyrus 56 2 22
6 1,488 Right anterior cingulate 10 23 30
Right middle cingulate 8 26 32
5 1,752 Left middle temporal gyrus 52 66 2
Left fusiform gyrus 46 64 6
7 968 Right middle temporal gyrus 48 60 0
Right inferior temporal gyrus 54 64 6
2 4,688 Left supramarginal gyrus 63 22 26
3 3,416 Right postcentral gyrus 58 21 33
Right supramarginal gyrus 64 21 30
Note: From left to right, the table reports the size (in mm3), stereotaxic coordinates of local maxima, and anatomical labeling of the clusters which were commonly
(top) and specifically (bottom) associated with the affective mentalizing and empathy networks. All the reported clusters survived a statistical threshold of p <.05 and
minimum volume size of 100 mm3.
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and the insula (extending into the IFG) are the key nodes of the inter-
oceptive awareness system and might thus underlie the neural repre-
sentation of both one's own and others' emotional states (Berntson &
Khalsa, 2021). This evidence strengthens the view of the insula as
input region of the empathy network, translating sensations into sub-
jective feelings and awareness (Medford & Critchley, 2010; Naor
et al., 2020), whereas the ACC might represent the output region
modulating empathy-related behavioral drives. The latter interpreta-
tion fits with the causal role of the ACC in the affective and motiva-
tional aspects of first-hand pain (Marsh, 2018), strengthened by the
evidence of its role in social situations characterized by negative emo-
tions (i.e., forgiveness; Ricciardi et al., 2013) and social pain
(Eisenberger, 2015). This interpretation is in line with evidence
reporting no decreased performance (i.e., accuracy and reaction time)
when processing others' pain in patients with cingulate cortex lesions
(Gu et al., 2012). Indeed, only the motivational facets of the empathic
response seem to be impaired with cingulate dysfunctions.
Our findings therefore appear to support simulation theories,
according to which a direct understanding of others' emotions is
mediated by a neural mechanism of embodied simulation producing
an “as-if” experience mediated by shared body states (Ciaunica, 2019;
Gallese, 2019). The joint engagement of the anterior insular and ACCs
might then allow an integrated awareness of the sensory, affective,
and cognitive facets of the overall empathetic response. It is worth
noting that the role of anterior insula and ACC as key nodes of the so-
called “salience network,” through which the detection of behaviorally
F IGURE 3 Differential brain responses to mentalizing and
empathic processing between schizophrenic or autistic patients and
healthy controls, resulting from the ALE analyses. All the reported
clusters survived a statistical threshold of p <.05, corrected for
cluster-level family wise error (FWE)
TABLE 9 Neural bases of mentalizing
in healthy controls compared with
schizophrenic patients
Cluster # Cluster size (mm3) Brain region x y z
1 1,080 Left middle temporal gyrus 46 66 12
Note: From left to right, the table reports the size (in mm3), stereotaxic coordinates of local maxima and
anatomical labeling of the clusters which were consistently associated with mentalizing in healthy
controls compared with schizophrenic patients. All the reported clusters survived a statistical threshold of
p <.05, corrected for cluster-level family wise error (FWE).
TABLE 10 Neural bases of mentalizing in healthy controls compared with autistic patients
Cluster # Cluster size (mm3) Brain region x y z
1 864 Left middle temporal gyrus/left temporo parietal junction 56 42 0
Note: From left to right, the table reports the size (in mm3), stereotaxic coordinates of local maxima, and anatomical labeling of the clusters which were
consistently associated with mentalizing in healthy controls compared with autistic patients. All the reported clusters survived a statistical threshold of p
<.05, corrected for cluster-level family wise error (FWE).
TABLE 11 Neural bases of empathic processing in healthy controls compared with autistic patients
Cluster # Cluster size (mm3) Brain region x y z
1 784 Right parahippocampal gyrus/right amygdala 22 10 26
Note: From left to right, the table reports the size (in mm3), stereotaxic coordinates of local maxima, and anatomical labeling of the clusters which were
consistently associated with empathic processing in healthy controls compared with autistic patients. All the reported clusters survived a statistical
threshold of p <.05, corrected for cluster-level family wise error (FEW).
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relevant stimuli activates controlled processes (Arioli, Basso, Carne,
Poggi, et al., 2021; Uddin, 2015), has prompted alternative accounts
of their engagement as reflecting the shared saliency of the stimuli
(Valentini & Koch, 2012).
4.2 | Neural bases of affective and cognitive
mentalizing and empathy
In this paragraph, we will initially present the results on the specific
and common activations between affective and cognitive mentalizing,
showing how social information is integrated in the two networks.
Next, we will analyze the interaction between these two networks
and the empathy system, trying to highlight the points of possible
communication between these circuits.
The affective and cognitive subcomponents of mentalizing
elicited consistent common activity in most of the aforementioned
nodes of the mentalizing network, that is, left posterior middle tempo-
ral and temporoparietal cortex, IFG bilaterally, alongside the dmPFC
and posterior-medial frontal cortex (Arioli & Canessa, 2019; Geiger
et al., 2019). These common activations support Shamay-Tsoory
et al.'s (2010) proposal that both ToM sub-conditions require a more
basic mentalizing ability, which is likely paralleled by condition-specific
activations (Molenberghs et al., 2016).
Indeed, affective mentalizing was also associated with stronger
activity than its cognitive counterpart in the left superior and middle
temporal pole, alongside the SMA and the IFG. This finding fits the
demands placed by affective ToM tasks, typically involving pictures or
videos of emotional expressions which are expected to activate simu-
lation routines associated with the frontal sector of the action obser-
vation network (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010), possibly in conjunction
with affectively enriched signals from the temporopolar cortex
(Geiger et al., 2019; Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009). While this pat-
tern suggests that even affective ToM might involve visceral emo-
tional reactions mediated by simulation routines (Winkielman,
Coulson, & Niedenthal, 2018), the activations associated with cogni-
tive mentalizing are more suggestive of higher-order abstract reason-
ing detached from viscerosensory processing (Molenberghs
et al., 2016). Stronger activation for cognitive than affective ToM was
indeed found in the TPJ, precuneus and dmPFC, whose role in rep-
resenting cognitive mental states such as beliefs, goals and intentions
(Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009) is now interpreted in the light of the
possible DMN role in self-projection (Spreng & Mar, 2012). Indeed,
the DMN is nowadays considered a “sense-making” network that
integrates incoming extrinsic inputs with prior intrinsic information to
form rich, context-dependent models of dynamic social situations
between the self and others (Li, Mai, & Liu, 2014). This kind of
processing appears particularly relevant for cognitive mentalizing, in
which the need to distinguish between appearance and reality, via
abstract representations of the situational context, might involve key
nodes of the DMN (Yeshurun et al., 2021) and particularly the
precuneus (Schlaffke et al., 2015), which supports episodic memory
retrieval and autobiographical memory (Hebscher et al., 2018; Schurz
et al., 2020). The present results provide novel insights into the rela-
tionship between affective and cognitive mentalizing, by suggesting a
gradient of activations associated with the two processes in the left
posterior lateral temporal cortex. This functional subdivision involves
three adjacent clusters encompassing the left posterior MTG, STS,
and TPJ, associated with affective-specific (green), overlapping
cognitive-affective (yellow), and finally cognitive-specific (red;
Figure 2a) activity, which might underpin the transition between the
processing of the affective facets of mental states and their neural
coding in terms of abstract cognitive representations detached from
sensory aspects. While further evidence is required to unveil the pos-
sible functional meaning of this gradient, it is noteworthy that similar
brain activations have been previously reported using both verbal
(Sebastian et al., 2012) and visual (Schlaffke et al., 2015) stimuli.
Moreover, previous studies highlighted a prominent role of the dorsal
and anterior/ventral TPJ sector in processing, respectively, false
beliefs and trait judgments (i.e., cognitive mentalizing) and social ani-
mations or gaze at the RMET (i.e., affective mentalizing; Schurz
et al., 2014). Alongside our evidence on a gradient of posterior tempo-
ral activity for these different facets of mentalizing, such pattern
reflects the “overarching view” model of functional specialization
(Cabeza, Ciaramelli, & Moscovitch, 2021), i.e., graded, rather than seg-
regated, functional subdivisions associated with specific facets of a
global cognitive function supported by a broader region. These obser-
vations are consistent with Lettieri et al.'s (2019) evidence that
moment-by-moment ratings of perceived emotions explain brain
activity in TPJ, with orthogonal and spatially overlapping TPJ gradi-
ents encoding the polarity, complexity, and intensity of emotional
experiences. The spatial arrangement of these gradients is thus well-
suited to map a variety of mental and affective states within TPJ.
Taken together, these findings might thus suggest that the subregion-
specific processing of affective versus cognitive information about a
person might provide a graded contribution to a more general
“mentalizing” function expressed in MTG/TPJ through an attentional
re-orienting to mental and affective states (Schurz et al., 2014).
The output of this process might be then relayed to the medial
frontal cortex, which has been suggested to play a role in forming
impressions of people (Mattavelli et al., 2011; Ferrari et al., 2016) and
in their accuracy (Spunt & Adolphs, 2014; Wagner, Kelley, Haxby, &
Heatherton, 2016). Also in the dmPFC, indeed, we observed a rostro-
caudal gradient of activity associated with both cognitive and affec-
tive mentalizing in its rostral-most sector (Figure 2a; yellow), followed
caudally by cognitive mentalizing (red), and finally by affective
mentalizing (green) in the SMA. This progression fits with the dmPFC
role in the cognitive proper aspects of mentalizing (Sebastian
et al., 2012), that is, when this process does not involve emotional
cues which rather seem to engage the vmPFC (Schlaffke et al., 2015).
Interestingly, the dorsomedial regions involved in this transition sur-
round a large anterior/middle cingulate cluster, which is consistently
associated with empathic processing (Lamm et al., 2011). The partial
overlap between the latter cluster and those associated with the gra-
dient from cognitive to affective mentalizing (Figure 2c,d) suggests
that an empathic processing might provide signals allowing a
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progressive transition from the abstract representation of cognitive
mental states detached from sensory facets to emotionally-charged
representations of affective mental states (Figure 4; blue). This pro-
gressive integration of different facets of social information fits with
the strong connectivity pattern between the posterior medial frontal
cortex and premotor, SMA and cingulate motor areas, which has been
suggested to underpin tasks tapping action monitoring and attention
(Amodio & Frith, 2006), but also mentalizing (Molenberghs
et al., 2016).
An analogous mosaic of areas belonging to these three systems,
possibly underpinning a reciprocal exchange of information, was also
found in the inferior frontal cortex, bilaterally. In the left hemisphere
we observed a mosaic of activations associated with empathy-specific
activity in the left anterior insula (blue; Figures 2d and 4), overlapping
empathy-affective mentalizing (cyan; Figure 2d), as well as cognitive-
affective mentalizing (yellow; Figure 4) and finally affective
mentalizing-specific (green; Figures 2d and 4) activations in adjacent
sector of the left IFG. Such an involvement of frontoinsular regions
for distinct facets of social understanding is in keeping with consider-
able evidence of its engagement when representing others' mental
states, both in healthy individuals (Grecucci, Giorgetta, Bonini, &
Sanfey, 2013) and in pathological conditions such as anorexia nervosa
(McAdams, Harper, & Van Enkevort, 2018). In the right hemisphere,
we observed mainly distinct activations associated with empathy-
specific processing in the caudal IFG (blue; Figure 4), and with cogni-
tive and affective mentalizing in its dorsal (red; Figure 4) and rostral
(green; Figure 4) sectors, respectively. This functional segregation
allows to refine previous reports of the right IFG involvement in both
affective mentalizing and empathy (Hooker, Verosky, Germine,
Knight, & D'Esposito, 2008). This region has been consistently associ-
ated with a variety of social cognitive processes, including emotional
contagion and emotion recognition (Schurz et al., 2014), and its com-
mon engagement by empathy and affective mentalizing supports the
possible contribution of simulation processes both to a direct, and a
cognitively-mediated, understanding of others' feeling and emotional
mental states (Molenberghs et al., 2016).
Altogether, these patterns of activation appear to support
Shamay-Tsoory et al.'s (2010) proposal that affective mentalizing
builds on both the output of cognitive mentalizing and an empathic
processing. However, while that model suggests that cognitive
mentalizing and empathy provide independent contributions to affec-
tive mentalizing, the present data fit a more naturalistic form of social
cognition characterized by networks of adjacent areas underlying
interconnected sub-processes, which support a more general ability of
affective mentalizing. Moreover, the present results provide evidence
for Schurz et al.'s (2020) hierarchical model, confirming the existence
of three different clusters underlying social cognition corresponding
to cognitive, affective mentalizing and empathy.
4.3 | Neural bases of altered mentalizing and
empathy in SC and ASD
Building on the results from healthy individuals, we aimed to unveil
the most consistent patterns of altered empathy- or ToM-related
brain activity in SC and ASD. Importantly, the heterogeneity of neuro-
imaging results from such pathological populations (Martinez-Murcia
et al., 2017) likely reflects the considerable heterogeneity of their clin-
ical manifestation (Alnaes et al., 2019; Mottron & Bzdok, 2020), rang-
ing from mild to profound (de Vries & Geurts, 2015), as well as at their
etiology (Jeste & Geschwind, 2014) and the associated pharmacologi-
cal treatments (Masi et al., 2017).
In line with recent meta-analytic evidence of abnormal activity in
the key sectors of the “social brain” in SC (Vucurovic et al., 2020), the
weaker ToM-related activation displayed by patients than HC in
the left posterior MTG and TPJ (Figure 3) allows to constrain the
widespread pattern of altered brain responses previously associated
with SC (e.g., Zhao et al., 2018). This observation fits with Kuroki
F IGURE 4 Commonalities and
differences across cognitive mentalizing,
affective mentalizing, and empathy
networks in healthy individuals, resulting
from the ALE analyses. Cognitive
mentalizing, affective mentalizing, and
empathy networks in this figure are
superimposed onto the same brain render
and slices. All the reported clusters
survived a statistical threshold of p <.05,
corrected for cluster-level family wise
error (FWE). AffM, affective mentalizing;
CogM, cognitive mentalizing; and Emp,
empathy
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et al.'s (2006) neurostructural evidence of decreased gray matter
(GM) volume of the left and right MTG in first episode SC (see also
Onitsuka et al., 2004) but not in first episode affective psychosis.
Indeed, these data led to consider GM volume of the left posterior
MTG, which additionally discriminates patients and unaffected siblings
from controls (Guo et al., 2014), as a biomarker for SC.
Importantly, we found no consistent evidence in schizophrenic
patients of abnormal activity in association with tasks requiring an
empathic processing. While this negative finding might appear in con-
flict with previous meta-analytic report of altered activity in the empa-
thy network (Vucirovic et al., 2020), it is noteworthy that Vucirovic
et al (2020) included in their “empathy” condition studies focused
explicitly on affective mentalizing (e.g., Mier et al., 2010). Indeed, sev-
eral individual studies reported no clear-cut evidence of altered brain
activity and behavioral performance in schizophrenic patients attend-
ing to others' pain (Horan et al., 2016; Vistoli, Lavoie, Sutliff, Jack-
son, & Achim, 2017) or emotions (Caruana, Stein, Watson, Williams, &
Seymour, 2019; Torregrossa et al., 2019). Lehmann et al. (2014) have
provided a more detailed characterization of schizophrenic patients'
defective understanding of others' emotions (i.e., affective
mentalizing), associated with a preserved ability to share or feel their
emotional states (i.e., empathy). The latter finding is further supported
by recent evidence of preserved emotional empathy in self-reported
and behavioral measurements in schizophrenic patients (Berger
et al., 2019). Overall, the present findings appear to highlight a possi-
ble neural basis of a specific deficit in mentalizing, with no clear evi-
dence of abnormal empathic processing in schizophrenic patients.
When engaged in mentalizing tasks, ASD patients displayed wea-
ker activity than HCs in the left posterior MTG, although in a more
rostral sector compared with the cluster previously reported for
schizophrenic patients (Figure 3). There is multifaceted evidence for a
role of this region in ASD patients' defective social understanding.
First, autistic patients displayed altered MTG and TPJ activity during
irony processing (Wang, Lee, Sigman, & Dapretto, 2006) and
mentalizing in a social context (Assaf et al., 2013; Sato, Toichi, Uono, &
Kochiyama, 2012). Moreover, decreased resting state FC has been
reported, in ASD, between the bilateral MTG and cerebellum (Ramos-
Cabo et al., 2019). Finally, both in children and adults with ASD the
degree of hypo-connectivity between posterior MTG and other
regions, including key nodes of the social brain such as IFG and
precuneus, has been shown to reflect the severity of social cognitive
and language deficits (Xu et al., 2020).
Interestingly, an association between altered MTG response and
defective mentalizing in both autism and SC has been previously
suggested, but never supported by empirical evidence
(e.g., Sugranyes, Kyriakopoulos, Corrigall, Taylor, & Frangou, 2011). In
this respect, growing evidence highlights the involvement of posterior
temporal areas both in the “mentalizing” (Moessnang et al., 2017;
Walbrin & Koldewyn, 2019) and default mode (Hyatt et al., 2020) net-
works. Impaired DMN FC (a measure of synchronous neural activity
between remote brain areas that define neural networks) has been
shown in SC and ASD (Hu et al., 2017; Padmanabhan, Lynch, Schaer, &
Menon, 2017), and associated with social functioning and cognitive
deficits in these disorders (Fox et al., 2017). Additionally, a resting
state-based classifier of ASD was effective at differentiating SC (but
not attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder or depression) from con-
trols (Yahata et al., 2016), suggesting a significant overlap in abnormal
DMN patterns—involving also TPJ—between ASD and SC (Hyatt
et al., 2020).
The posterior temporal clusters in which altered activity was
found in autistic and schizophrenic patients are adjacent to the tem-
poral regions, which, in healthy individuals, appear to support the
graded transition between affective and cognitive mentalizing. While
this proposal will require further supporting evidence, this overlap
might underpin both affective and cognitive mentalizing deficits in
autistic and schizophrenic patients. Unfortunately, the lack of studies
investigating the two subcomponents of mentalizing does not allow
to perform distinct meta-analyses specifically addressing affective or
cognitive mentalizing in these populations.
Autistic patients additionally displayed decreased activity of the
amygdala in association with tasks requiring an empathic processing.
The involvement of this structure in ASD patients' social deficits was
largely expected (e.g., Rausch et al., 2018), based on the notion that
the amygdala underpins emotion-related social cognitive functions
such as emotion recognition, socio-communicative perception and
regulation of emotional responses (Inman et al., 2020). Increasing evi-
dence indeed supports a system-level view of ASD patients' social
deficits, whose severity reflects the degree of altered connectivity
between the amygdala and other regions underpinning social commu-
nication and language, including MTG (Shen et al., 2016). Altogether,
these data strengthen the view that ASD psychopathology might
reflect the breakdown of crucial social cognitive functions such as
mentalizing and empathy, related to functional (and possibly struc-
tural) alterations of some of their key neural correlates in the middle
temporal cortex and amygdala (Rolls et al., 2020). Importantly, the
presence of altered brain responses in association with both empathy
and mentalizing in ASD is consistent with a model in which affective
mentalizing depends on empathic ability (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2010).
Indeed, this model proposed that empathy supports affective
mentalizing and, consequentially, an empathy deficit should reflected
also in affective mentalizing abnormalities. Unfortunately, due to the
lack of studies on mentalizing in autistic population and schizophrenic
patients, we could no implement two separate meta-analysis for
affective and cognitive mentalizing.
4.4 | Limitations
The present findings should be considered in the light of some limita-
tions. First, in the meta-analysis on mentalizing in HC versus ASD, we
included only 15 studies, against the suggested minimum number of
17 studies (Muller et al., 2018). While other meta-analyses on the
same topic have included a similar number of studies (e.g., Dijkstra
et al., 2020; Kim, Cunnington, & Kirby, 2020), this numerosity limits
the generalizability of our findings. Moreover, participants' age was
not a selection criterion for the studies comparing healthy participants
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with autistic and schizophrenic patients. Although age-related param-
eters such as mean or range are typically not used to select studies for
meta-analyses on clinical populations (e.g., Peng et al., 2020;
Vucurovic et al., 2020), and social cognitive deficits have been
reported regardless of age both in SC (Tordjman et al., 2019) and
autism (Moody & Laugeson, 2020), the presence of differently aged
populations might represent a possible confounding variable which
future studies should control for. Finally, with the growth of the rele-
vant literature, future studies might address possible specific alter-
ations of brain activity associated with affective versus cognitive
mentalizing in autism and SC. Only studying empathy, cognitive and
affective mentalizing is possible to empirically confirm theoretical
model on the relationship between these three socio-psychological
constructs.
4.5 | Conclusions and future directions
This quantitative meta-analysis of previously published fMRI data
provides novel evidence on the neural bases of empathy, affective
mentalizing and cognitive mentalizing, which might help refining the
classification and neural characterization of these crucial building
blocks of social communication (Cerniglia et al., 2019). The well-
known ambiguity comes from the definition of cognitive versus
affective subcomponents of ToM and empathy. Shamay–Tsoory is
the first author who tried to clarify the situation, elaborating a
model in which a specific role was defined for all of the components
and our results confirm, at the neuroanatomical level, this proposals,
according to which affective mentalizing builds on cognitive
mentalizing and empathic skills (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2010). This
process might involve the contribution of adjacent regions underly-
ing these functions in the posterior temporal, medial frontal, and
inferior frontal cortex, some of which were additionally found to dis-
play altered brain activity in schizophrenic and/or ASD patients.
While no empathy-related changes of brain activity were found in
SC, the present evidence of altered ToM-related activity in the left
posterior MTG/TPJ in both SC and ASD, and of empathy-related
activity of the amygdala in ASD, paves the way for further studies
addressing the neural bases of impaired social cognition and com-
munication in these disorders. These results might also inform the
design of rehabilitation interventions tailored on specific facets of
social cognitive and communication skills which appear to be selec-
tively impaired in different conditions, and of innovative treatment
protocols targeting their specific neural correlates through
neuromodulation (Davey et al., 2015; Donaldson, Rinehart, &
Enticott, 2015).
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